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invoke the biological essentialism out of which anthropology was forged as a colonial discipline and against which a contemporary critical anthropology vigilantly works to define its corrections in course.6 These corrections have been crucial in the discursive realms of gender and race. When in 1996 the American Association of Physical Anthropologists (AAPA) published its findings on race, including the statement that "biophysical diversity has no inherent social meaning except what we humans confer upon it," it specifically addressed anthropology's historical function for colonizers who would use "race" ideology to justify the trade in human property and to assert a normative white supremacy.' At the same time, the AAPA statement indicated an affinity with the concerns of feminist anthropologists that biologistic gender distinctions not be naturalized along similar lines, that such distinctions be exposed for their part in programs to objectify, commodify, and control women. Extended to science culture, these concerns translate to a commitment that humans' genetic makeup be defetishized and decommodified in the rhetoric and social practices of the scientific "community," broadly construed. Fundamentally, it is a commitment that recognizes human personhood and "technologies of self" as social from the start. That is, they are culturally shaped by, and shaping, historically situated conditions and practices of human bondage and human agency-and likewise any respectable bioethics.8
The present paper takes this project to the movies. On one level, this is to acknowledge popular cinema's place of honor in bioethical rhetoric and popular debate about genetically engineered entities; in late modernity's image-conscious condition, popular films are major cultural documents of the social life of the public moment. So while I set aside for now discussion of the diverse audience responses and multisite film produc- 
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Multiplicities tion fieldwork that would add an ethnographic dimension and value to such a project, it is, I believe, worthwhile to follow out some narrative themes in films in which replication "passes" for reproduction-and in which human copies similarly "pass" for multiples of persons.9 More generally, I probe what might be termed the replication problematic: what happens when a human being doubles by design and the self presents itself as supplement to the self.'0 At base here is a notion of supplement as something that supplies, or makes apparent, insufficiencies. The supplement of new knowledge, for example, shows the limitations and strengths of prior knowledge with which it interacts. Supplementation, in this sense, is a process of new knowledge acting upon prior, never total or sufficient, knowledge, and in consequence placing the stability of the latter at risk, for better or worse." As such, supplementation is elemental to social exchange-though underinvestigated as such. I argue the point that feature film replicants and clones are corporealizations of the supplement's capacity to destabilize the social paradigms and self-knowledge of their creators. The fact that these doubles range across genres of science fiction, drama, and film comedy is apposite precisely because the idea of the double in different ways confounds cultural boundaries, including film genres, revealing their inadequacy to contain it. Thus films as different from one another as Invasion of the Body Snatchers In no time, the clone is sent off to the office in Doug's place, leaving Doug more time for his wife and kids and various leisure pursuits. The clone, tattooed with the number 2, proceeds to distinguish himself from Doug by performing Doug's job with alpha-male zeal. The entire arrangement is so successful, at least initially, that Doug has himself cloned again, producing 3, the sensitive, feminized homemaker who can help with kids and kitchen. Then the clones audaciously take it upon themselves to have 2 cloned, producing the inbred 4, a simpleton "child" who does manual chores and, being unruly and a messy eater, is closest to animal nature.'9 In short, the "use-value" of the clones is embodied as gender and age stereotypes, reproduced as an all-male, but not allmasculine, nuclear family with a somewhat uncertain future. 19 . The fact that 4 is related to Doug as a degraded copy passing as his clone makes 4 an interestingly ambiguous figure. A product of the clones' free agency, he is himself freer than the others of the workplace disciplines of conduct and thought that mould their personhood. One consequence is that he appears at times as a kind of idiot savant whom Doug consults when he needs to simplify his life. Also, 4 embodies the unpredictable genetic outcome of "germline" manipulation-as it were, the generational future of the innocently dangerous gene supplement within. 
Male Parthenogenesis: From Paterfamilias to Prion
From the viewpoint of an ethnographer, this scenario of male parthenogenesis would not seem in the least exotic to certain male cult practitioners in Melanesia, whose self-induced acts of symbolic menstruation and birth are meant to ensure the reproductive future of the natural world at large.20 The cloning fantasy is nothing if not gendered, and no less in the corridors of science culture than in the bush. Jackie Stacey has argued that in Alien: Resurrection female cloning presents an "excess of sameness," a problematic that renders same-sex doubling monstrous (she cites Elizabeth Grosz) more generally speaking ("S"). But in the masculine mode it would appear that more of the same is neither invariably excessive nor monstrous, meaning that less of the same is the issue, in the movies at least.
The male urge to double appears in its most sympathetic light when it addresses a functional deficiency of men in a world of women who wish to have it all. In Multiplicity, Doug's crisis of time is precipitated by his wife who, first pleadingly, then willfully, accepts a job outside the home Evil, but no excess of productivity produces a monstrous male double. Virulent consumption, however, is another matter. When I was doing fieldwork in Melanesia among Sabarl islanders, this was an explicit theme of sorcery discourse. In these parts both men and women might acquire reputations for sending out spirit doubles that could give them supernatural access to knowledge. However, women inherited their powers through their mother's blood, whereas men learned their techniques as sorcerers' apprentices. A reputation for sorcery gave men an advantage in political life. But more dreaded than any sorcerer was the bibiloia, an entity whose dedication to human consumption could transform him into a monster that traveled not in spirit but in flesh, at great speed and far range, to feast on human bodies.
Tom his social set (his social doubles). The effect is to generate a negative patriline with Ripley as originary ancestor; Ripley, having first murdered his own identity, absorbs Dickie's. Here, it is a fear of class insufficiency that produces the displacing clone as a kind of prionistic agent, devouring humanity from his place of privilege within the social body, a proteinaceous infectious particle in its social aspect. A homophobic message is all but explicit in this film, arguably projected onto the 1950s from the era of AIDS.23
Heidegger approaches technology as both "a way of revealing ... whatever does not bring itself forth," an "arising of something from itself," and in its negative capacity, as a "setting upon" nature an "unreasonable demand" upon it "directed from the beginning toward something else" that places nature "on call" or "on stand-by."24 An essentialized Heideggerian "nature" notwithstanding, the clones of the movies are corporealizations of this double capacity of technology.25 Their promise, as we see in the clones of Multiplicity, is that they may beget or elicit useful knowledge of the original, who can never be seen or see himself in the same light afterwards. Or, like Hitler clones, they may set upon humanity, becoming hegemony's most lethal weapons. The various film scenarios of human doubles would appear to be showing us that, genetic or social, cloning is anything but a final solution to social problems, including the ultimate social problem of human mortality. Like all examples of cultural rhetoric, this one contains its potential opposite.
Continuities and Discontinuities
The travesty of the human clone, that it can be reduced to a derelationalized unit of production in the service of commercial and/or political agendas, is the travesty of mistaking the value of the (nonagentive, reified) part for the contingent, relational (agentive) person. This is not dissimilar to the problem posed by the cultivation of transplantable organs. Of course, in Multiplicity's replication scenarios, no one needs to die 23. Although the social clone is not invariably a figure of lethal consumption, the idea of fashioning a replica identity is at least problematic and a topic in the literature of gay "clonism." Lauritsen, for example, has argued that "negative aspects of the Gay Clone Lifestyle, with a particular focus upon the premier gay clone drug 'poppers' (or nitrite inhalants)," and the evolution of gay social cloning is tied to the "profit-logic of an expanding sex industry" globally ( A powerful cross-cultural study by Lawrence Cohen that considers the discourse of Alzheimer's victimage in the popular media offers a kind of reversed perspective on the issues.28 Alzheimer's produces xerox copies of bodies whose minds have lost definition in the process, or bodies whose claims to subjectivity have anyway become blurred. Yet the Alzheimer'sstricken subject loses, rather than gains, history (among other capacities). Faced with reduction to "neural static," his or her agency and ability to relate are mortally compromised or defined away by medico-legal terminology.
Alzheimer's, then, produces (by a different agency than Mr. Ripley's or the bibiloia's) a multiplicity of victims, wherein, as Cohen recognizes, the initial victim must be "disappeared" in order that survivors become unambiguously the object 6f therapeutic intervention. The first victim is the patient as a degraded self, the second the survivors whose relationship to the patient medical rhetoric renders ghoulish. That is, shifting It is perhaps not surprising that human cloning "romances," like those on the Human Cloning Foundation's website, erase the figure of the intermediary agent and focus instead on the self-replication of a unique person or relationship. Cloning fantasies express the peculiarly Euroamerican "obsession with uniqueness," as Hopkins puts it, "pouring the weight of that concept into genetic patterns."29 One woman's letter on the website states that she wants to clone herself in order to "raise herself" differently; another's that she "can never be a mother any other way." A couple whose families have never understood their love wish to have themselves cloned, hoping for a more sympathetic response next time round. The website pleads for a "genetic encore" for Stephen Hawking, whose clone could live a life free of disabilities (he is said to be in support of the idea). A physician writes, "human cloning will mean the same as the resurrection of Jesus Christ or Gautama Buddha."30
In her recent paper, Stacey argues eloquently that the "genetic turn" in popular science culture "can be seen to reconstitute the boundaries and the desirable shape of the human body in the making" through its figurations of abnormal bodies. She continues, "this division between 29. Hopkins, "Bad Copies," p. 9. 30. Quoted from www.humancloning.org.
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Debbora Battaglia Multiplicities monstrous and proper bodies pervades both the narrative structure and iconographic landscape of all the Alien films" ("S").31 The idea of the human double as it appears elsewhere in popular cinema in hybridized genres invites us to consider a supplementary model to the semiotic one that organizes critical inquiry in terms of body metaphors and boundary maintenance and the insider/outsider, periphery/center categories they require. More specifically, it invites us to reconsider the idea of a boundary between replication and reproduction and its problematic of a "proliferation of sameness."32 This other model that would refocus analytic attention on social exchange foregrounds the transactions, both monstrous and beneficial, that enable and compromise human connection. The view from exchange theory demands that we consider which forms of social exchange and which patterns of relation set upon social connection, violate social futures, and which beget and elicit these in particular cultural and historical locations.
The idea of the clone as supplement is that unlike the replicant, which requires no connection to an original and is often seen questing for a connection, even a negative connection, to its makers (such as the toy maker and Tyrell Corporation CEO of Blade Runner), the clone embodies the closest relation to the original. The clone's existence requires an other-which is why the clone goes against the grain of totalizing romantic narratives and images and why the idea of the heroic clone seems somehow wrong, whereas the heroic replicant makes sense.33 In other words, replicants slip their parameters and become agents of their own futures, when they show themselves to be "more human than humans" (the Tyrell Corporation advertising slogan), they are consigned to the camouflage of a racially, linguistically, and architecturally creolized urban underworld marked by cosmopolitanism run amok. This is the natural environment, the hyperactive and hyperplastic gray area of the categorically monstrous. As "skin jobs" stripped of historical color, replicants use their racial invisibility to infiltrate a monolithic white ruling class that depersonalizes and enslaves them. 
In the End: A Moral Economy
Eventually, Doug loses his job, his wife, and kids. In post-Faustian fashion, he has traded off the humanizing experiences of his social relationships to his stand-ins. His self-replication and the resultant fragmentation of productive self-functioning have won him his battle with time but lost him the meaningful social connections he originally sought to safeguard. He finally decides to dispatch his clones (the director referred to them as his "personalities" and his "masculine," "feminine," and "inner child" "selves") to whatever future they might make for themselves: the clones go South, driving off in a convertible to open a pizza joint in Florida. 45 The fetishization of time in late-capitalist nightmarescapes, which is central to replication films and an explicit theme of Multiplicity, returns us to the social practice of memory and forgetting. The condition of the hero's stable self is, paradoxically, that he must remember to forget that his multiplicity is commodity driven. Or, put another way, he must forget the notion of evolutionary progress in order to recall and celebrate the recombinative value of the social relations that constitute him as a person in terms not amenable to quantification. Of course, in stating this, the director and I part company (or, rather, we engage different and supplementary models), for I find a significant difference between multiplying wholes (individuals) and parts (personality traits) and a danger for healthy sociality in taking the latter for the former. The film's narrative calls its own bluff on this point: Doug's plan-or, more precisely, the Gemini scientist's solution for him-goes awry. Whereas the myth of totality (and totalitarianism) imagines a world in which the whole of life is subject to the will of one scientist, one regime, or one corporation, the film is saying, Let the buyer, or creator, beware any expression of the double's , N.J., 1996) . 45. Ramis, interview with author.
